GOETHE AND SCHOPENHAUER ON MATHEMATICS.
BY ARNOLD EMCH.

mere accidental coincidence that Goethe and Schopenhauer
in some of their writings should both express themselves more
or less adversely towards mathematics and mathematical methods
in the study of natural phenomena?
The fact that Schopenhauer in 1813, when twenty-five years
of age, went to Weimar and became acquainted with Goethe,
under whose powerful influence he wrote a memoir Ueber Sehen
iind die Farben (published in 1816), would warrant the conclusion
that their opinions on various scientific topics were a result of

IS

it

a

rather penetrating mutual discussions.
It is a proof for the universality of their intellects that they
dared to enter into a discussion on the merits of a science of which
both had only a very rudimentary knowledge. There is a kernel
of truth in some of their statements, while others are dilettantic

and

still

As

others erroneous or at least warped.

known, Goethe was deeply interested in problems of
life, and his fundamental discoveries justly entitle him to be classed as a pioneer of Darwinism.
That Goethe was fully aware of his handicap in attacking certain
scientific problems appears from the following extract from "Mathe"Considering my inclinations and conmatics and its Abuse"^
ditions I had to appropriate to myself very early the right to investigate, to conceive nature in her simplest, most hidden origins
as well as in her most revealed, most conspicuous creations also
.1 was accused of being an opwithout the aid of mathematics.
ponent, an enemy of mathematics in general, although nobody can
appreciate it more highly than I, as it accomplishes exactly those
things which I was prevented from realizing."
is

well

natural philosophy during his later

:

.

^

.
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Weimar,

1893.
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Further on, however, when the thought turns again upon
mathematics and mathematicians, we find this curious statement :"It is a wrong conception to think that a phenomenon could be
explained by calculus

Frenchmen

if

;

language, and then

On

or words"

it

following striking manner:
is

he ought to be

"The mathematician

is

like

own

in the

perfect only in

a perfect man, as he feels the beauty of truth only
clear, graceful
;

then does he become thorough, penetrating, pure,
and even elegant. All this is necessary to become

What

into their

natural science in general, Goethe

expresses his idea of the ntathematician as
so far as he

it

very soon something entirely different."

will be

when writing about

page 138

and "mathematicians are

one speaks to them they translate

like

Lagrange."

had in mind when he wrote:
the same time thieves, and these

particular individual he

"There are pedants who are at
It is a partial consolation
are by far the worst," is not revealed.
find
that Goethe already had
however,
to
scientists,
the
modern
for
to contend with such types.

extremely interesting that Goethe should quote d'Alembert
as an authority on mathematics. We see here the influence of the
encyclopedists upon European thought of that great period. There
It is

probably never lived a more brilliant and influential circle of philosophers and scientists that shaped the destiny of nations. Diderot

and d'Alembert as co-editors of the great Encyclopedie ou

dic-

tiotinaire raisonnc des sciences, des arts et des metiers, Helvetius
in his famous work De Vesprit, Voltaire by his piercing satire and

Rousseau by

his educational philosophy.

La Mettrie

as the author

of L'homme machine^ and Holbach in his Systcme de
were all teaching that a new time had arrived.

With

the exception of

la

nature,

Kant, the great intellectual giant

at

Konigsberg, Germany had during that whole period no philosophers
and scientists of her own to boast of. From 1741 to 1766 it was
the Swiss Euler and from 1766»to 1787 Lagrange, who gave lustre
to the Academy at Berlin. Others, like the poet-scientist Haller, as
appears from the dedication* of L'honune machine, were intellectuTowards the
ally not even a match with such men as La Mettrie.

end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century
Gauss began his epoch-making discoveries and thereby placed Ger''Loc.

cit.

p. 98.

English translation by Gertrude C. Bussey, published by the Open Court
Publishing Co.
'

^This is not included in the above-mentioned English edition, but may be
found in The Open Court of July, 1913, p. 427.
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men

like

d'Alembert, Lagrange, Monge, Laplace, Legendre and Fourier had

won

international reputation.

Gauss, however, never published anything for a general scienpublic on his early meditations on the nature of mathematical

tific

reasoning and in particular on what

we

call

now non-Euclidean

geometry, so that naturally Goethe, even in his old age, was not
able to learn anything about the

The passage

new views

in the science of space.

of d'Alembert to which Goethe refers

may

be

famous Discours prcliminaire de I'encyclopcdie:^
"As regards mathematical sciences, which constitute the second
of the limits of which we have spoken, their nature and their number must not startle us. What are most of the axioms of which
geometry is so proud, if not the expression of the same simple
idea by two different signs or words?
The man who says that
tzvo times tzvo is four, does he know more than somebody that
contents himself by saying tzvo times tzvo is tzvo times tzvo ? The
ideas of the whole, the part, of greater and less, properly speaking,
are they not the same simple and individual idea since one cannot
have one of them without the others presenting themselves all at
the same time?
As some philosophers have observed we owe
many errors to the abuse of words it is perhaps to the same abuse
found

in the

;

;

we owe

that

This

is

the axioms."

Goethe quotes, so that without the

as far as

rest of

d'Alembert's argument one might look upon the latter as a rather
one-sided

critic.

From

d'Alembert's achievements as a mathemati-

cian and those portions of his Discours that treat of the various
divisions of mathematics

it

is

plain

what great

intrinsic value

he

placed upon mathematics and the mathematical spirit in scientific
investigations in general.
When he speaks of the abuse of words
he simply states those truths which later his famous compatriot
Poincare, on various occasions, advanced against some claims of

the

modern

logisticians.

Concerning

logic

d'Alembert has the following to say:'' "It is
manner in which knowledge is gained

the reduction to an art of the

and

in

which we conmmunicate reciprocally our own thoughts to
It teaches to arrange ideas in the most natural order
link them by the most direct chain of thoughts, to resolve

each other.

and

to

number of simpler ideas, to look at
order to present them to others in a form

those that contain too large a

them from

all sides,

in

'CEuvres de D'Alembert, Vol.
°

Loc.

cit,

pp. 33-34.

I,

pp. 30-32, Paris 1821.
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which they can be

It is in this that this

easily grasped.

science

and which is justly considered as the key to
One must not believe, however, that it occupies

of reasoning consists
all

the

our knowledge.
first

The

place in the realm of invention.

art of reasoning

is

by nature of her own accord to good intellects
and
it may be said that the books which treat of
esprits)
(bons
logic are hardly of any use except to those who can get along
without them.^ Those that are familiar with Poincare's style might
easily mistake the last humerous remark as one of his famous

a gift presented
;

sallies.

In this connection it is interesting to see what a modern writer,
Mr. H. C. Brown, thinks about "the problem of method in mathe"The fact which seems to have
matics and philosophy." He writes
been neglected by mathematicians is that the proof of consistency,
by demanding an exhibition of something already known, puts a
check on the "free creation" theory of mathematical systems and
places them logically on a level with the concepts of all other sciA merely
ences which all aim at hypothetico-deductive procedure.
deductive mathematics would be of as little value as a 'freely
All sciences must turn upon some existence,
created' philosophy.
and a science wliich turns to a merely imagined world is dream:'^

—

—

...

play."

D'Alembert returns with great

methods

in

his

Essai sur

to

a discussion of the

human knowledge and

of the various branches of

principles
scientific

detail

Ics

of

clcmens de philosophie.^

For the mathematicians and philosophers that make a study of the
foundations of science, chapters fourteen to twenty are of par-

On

ticular interest.

discussion

of

the

parallel-axiom.

pp. 278-280. for instance,
difficulties

that

arise

The "Elements" were

when hardly anybody thought

in

we

find a very clever

connection

with the

published in 1759, at a tims

of a critical examination of Euclid's

Elements. ^°

Schopenhauer's remarks on mathematical questions were on
From his principal work Die

the whole less personal than Goethe's.
iVelt als Wille

und

V orstellung

^'^

whose

first

volume appeared

in

1819 (a second edition increased by a second volume did not appear
till 1844) we translate the following lines on Euclid's method:
"

See a recent

temps,"
"

in

article

by

La Revue du Mots,

J.

Charpentier "Diderot et la science de son
8, pp. 537-552 (Nov. 1913).
:

Vol.

Essays Philosophical and Psychological,

p.

427.

'Loc.'cit., pp. 115-348.

La geometria del coiiipasso by Mascheroni appeared in 1797
" IVerke, Vol. I, p. 75 (Leipsic, F. A. Brockhaus, 1901).

^''

in Pavia.
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and

all

This treattheorem
begins
every
not
essential,
and,
indeed,
ment, however, is
is
independent
itself
with a new construction in space which in
of the preceding ones and which in reality can be recognized also
demonstrations are successively subordinated to them.

in entire

independence of them,

in itself,

by pure intuition of space,

most complicated construction is immediately as evident as the axiom itself."
This remarkable statement interpreted by an inventive geometrician or intuitionist of the present day would of course not
stand serious criticism. How, for instance, should Steiner's famous
solution of Malfatti's problem to construct three circles each tangent to the other two and to two sides of the triangle, or the
Steinerian problem of closure in connection with cubics and quarFrom a
tics be obvious even to the most acute geometrician?
more general standpoint the only reasonable meaning which may
be placed on Schopenhauer's idea is that an intrinsic geometric
truth is independent of any particular set of axioms.
Schopenhauer denies the creative power of logistic geometry
when he says "that intuition is the first source of evidence and
that the immediate and intermediate relations derived from it are
the only absolute truth, furthermore that the shortest path to truth
is always the surest and that the transmission through concepts is
in

which

in reality also the

subject to

many

illusions. ..

.We demand

the reduction of every

one of an intuitional nature Euclid's mathematics,
however, makes great efiforts to cast off wantonly its intuitional
evidence everywhere near at hand, in order to substitute in place
logical proof to

of

it

;

a logical proof.

We

must

find that this

is

as

if

somebody

go on crutches. .. .That what
Euclid proves is true we have to acknowledge through the principle
of contradiction but we do not learn the reason why it is true.
We experience therefore almost the same unpleasant sensation
that is caused by a sleight-of-hand performance, and, indeed, most

would cut

his legs off in order to

;

proofs singularly resemble such tricks.
The truth
always appears through the back door, since it results
by accident from some minor condition. An apagogical proof often
closes one door after another and leaves open only one through which
xA.ccording to our opinion, therefore. Euclid's method in
to pass.
of

Euclid's

almost

mathematics appears as a very brilliant perversity (Verkehrtheit)."
Schopenhauer maintains that the reason for the Euclidean
system could be traced back to the prevailing philosophic system

:
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The Eleatics were the first to discover the difference,
and frequently the contradiction, between the things observed and
the same things thought of. The sophists and skeptics drew attention to ilkisions, i. e., to the deception of the senses.
It was recognized that intuition through the senses was not always reliable.
For this reason they came to the conclusion that only logical reasoning could establish truth.
Plato and Pyrrhon, on the other
hand, showed by examples how definitions and conclusions in
agreement with the laws of logic were likewise apt to mislead
and to produce sophisms which were much more difficult to solve
than deceptions of the senses.
Rationalism in opposition to empiricism however became the dominant philosophy, and, according
to Schopenhauer, it is under its influence that Euclid wrote his
"Elements," in which he felt compelled to regard only the axioms
as based upon intuitional evidence (<f)aLv6fji€vov) while the remainder
follows from conclusions (vooi'/xevov). In a highly refined form the
controversy which separated the Greeks is still present. As Carus^says: "In philosophy we have the old contrast between the empiricist and transcendentalist."
Concerning the origin or the startingpoint of mathematical system the same author remarks "that the
data of mathematics are not without their premises they are not,
as the Germans say, voraussetzungslos, and though mathematics is
built up from nothing, the mathematician does not start with nothing.
He uses mental implements and it is they that give character
of that time.

;

to his science."^^

Schopenhauer's conception of the domain that should be charmathematics is that the existence of a mathematical
truth should be equivalent with the reason for it.
It would of
acteristic of

course be a tremendous advantage

if this

equivalence could always

most simple manner by pure intuition, even
when conceived in a higher sense. This method followed by the
inventive mathematician as conceived by Poincare is of a superior
type and has presumably led to the greatest mathematical discoveries.
The process of coordination with other branches and of
be established

in the

rigorous analysis of the elements that constitute the truth

sequently a problem of
lecture^*

the mathematical

logician.

is

sub-

In a noted

on humanistic education and exact science Poincare said

" The Foundations of Mathematics, a Contribution to the Philosophy of
Geometry, p. 36. Chicago, Open Court Publishing Co., 1908.
" See also the valuable and clearly written article "De la methode dans les
sciences" by E. Picard in De la science, pp. 1-30, Paris, 1909.
" Delivered at the annual session of the Verein der Freunde des humanistischen Gymnasiums in Vienna, May 22, 1912.
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"Before he [the mathematician] demonstrates he must
But nobody has ever invented anything by pure deduction.
logic cannot create anything

namely induction

;

;

there

is

only one

way

invent.

Pure

to discovery,

for the mathematician as well as for the phys-

Induction, however, presupposes the art of divination and

icist.

the ability to select

wait for certitude.

we must be satisfied with
To do this, however, requires
;

intuition

and not

a refined intellect

For this reason there are two kinds of matheThere are some that possess the mathematical spirit

(esprit de finesse).

maticians.

only

;

they

may

be valuable laborers

many

of them.

there are

some

We

who pursue

successfully the

we need
But beside these more common mathematicians

paths laid out for them.

need people of

this kind,

that possess the esprit de finesse, they are the truly

creative intellects."
It is true that the famous example for the evidence of the
Pythagorean theorem shows the limited mathematical knowledge of
Schopenhauer, or else he would have known that "evident" proofs
of the general theorem are numerous. That Schopenhauer, in spite
of some valuable critical remarks on mathematical methods did not
understand the true meaning of Euclid's method and much less the
raison d'etre of non-Euclidean geometry^'^ appears from the follow-

ing characteristic passage:

"In the famous controversy over the theory of parallel lines
and in the perennial attempts to prove the Uth axiom, the Euclidean
method of demonstration has born from its own fold its most appropriate parody and caricature .... This scruple of consciousness
reminds me of Schiller's question of law
Nase zum Riechen;
auch ein erweisliches Recht?'

'Jahre lang schon bedien' ich mich meiner

Hab

ich

denn wirklich an

sie

[Years upon years I've been using my nose for the purpose of smelling.
I must question myself: Have I a right to its use?]i6

Now
"I

made
is

am

surprised that the eighth axiom: 'Figures that can be

coincident are equal.' should not be attacked.

either a

mere tautology or

else

For, to coincide

something of an entirely empirical

Lobatschevsky's epoch-making work on parallels appeared between 1829
(English translation by George Bruce Halsted under the title Geometrical Researches on the Theory of Parallels).
The Science Absolute of
Space by Bolyai, equally important, was published in 1826 (English translation by Dr. Halsted). Die gcometrischen Constructioncn, ausgefiihrt mittels
der geraden Linie und eines festen Kreises, by Steiner, appeared in 1833.
" See Carus, Goethe and Schiller's Xenions.
^°

and

1840.
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character which does not belong to pure intuition. It presupposes
movement of figures. In space, however, only matter is movable."

In Parerga und Paralipomena}'^ Schopenhauer, discussing op-

when he writes "On the
Frenchmen have nothing but nonsensical
theories on undulations and homogeneous light, besides computations which are not based upon anything. They are constantly in a
haste to measure and to calculate they consider this as the main

tical

questions, strikes a personal note

:

polarization of light the

;

and their slogan is le calcul! le calcul! But I say, Oil le calctil
commence, rintelUgence des phcnouicnes cesse: he who has only
numbers in his head cannot find the trace of the connective cause."
Here again we see that Schopenhauer, like Goethe, did not
appreciate at all what the French mathematical physicists had done.
But how, without hardly any mathematical knowledge, could they
expect to understand the Frenchmen? Nothing could show better

thing,

than the foregoing statement the scientific limitations of the otherwise towering intellect of Schopenhauer.

Of

the real difficulties

mathematics neither Goethe nor
Schopenhauer had a true conception. They were not able to anticipate even a possibility of the tremendous progress that has since
been made and had been made during Schopenhauer's lifetime.
that

lie

at

the

foundation

of

But considered from a modern standpoint their often ill-tempered remarks appear as interesting flash-lights of a great historic
period.

"Loc.

cit.

Vol.

11, p.

128.

